6. “The Kadizadeli Movement as a Social and Political Phenomenon: The Rise of a ‘Mercantile Ethic’?”, in A. Anastasopoulos (ed.), Political Initiatives from the Bottom-Up in the Ot...

Chapter · January 2012

1 author:

Marinos Sariyannis
Foundation for Research and Technology - Hellas

THE KADIZADELİ MOVEMENT AS A SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHENOMENON: THE RISE OF A 'MERCANTILE ETHIC'?

Marinos SARIYANNIS*

THE HISTORY OF IDEAS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE is still at a very preliminary stage; few scholars have examined broader intellectual movements beyond individual thinkers, and these studies usually focus on Ottoman political thought proper. Moreover, establishing relations between ideological currents and socio-economic or political developments in the course of history remains a *desideratum*, apart from Ahmet Yaşar Ocak's groundbreaking studies of sixteenth-century religious movements as a vehicle for political opposition.[1] In this paper I propose to study the well-known 'fundamentalism' that arose throughout the seventeenth century in the light of the emergence of new mercantile strata in the same period; I will try to suggest that this current served the new classes in their struggle for political power, showing that it played an active role in the political factionalism that dominated the mid seventeenth-century Istanbul power field.

The Kadızadelis: Historical Outline and State of Research

This paper will focus on the fundamentalist movement known as 'the followers of Kadızade' or the Kadızadelis, a movement which, as is well known, dominated the political and ideological scene of the Ottoman Empire throughout the seventeenth century. The main characteristics of its ideology were opposition to any innovation (*bid'at*), as opposed to the way of life in the time of the Prophet Muhammad, and especially a violent struggle against the dervish brotherhoods, and more specifically the Halvetis. The forerunner of the movement was Birgivî Mehmed b. Pir Ali (1522-1573), an eminent theo-

* Foundation for Research and Technology-Hellas, Institute for Mediterranean Studies.
I wish to thank Drs Antonis Anastasopoulos, Elias Kolovos, Baki Tezcan, and Eunjeong Yi, as well as Ms Marina Demetriadou for their insightful remarks and kind assistance. The anonymous reader's observations were also very fruitful and helpful.

1 See, for instance, A. Y. Ocak, 'Les réactions socio-religieuses contre l'idéologie officielle ottomane et la question de *zendeqa ve ilhâd* (hérésie et athéisme) au XVI[e] siècle', *Turcica*, 21-23 (1991), 71-82; Idem, *Osmanlı Toplumunda Zındıklar ve Mülhidler (15.-17. Yüzyıllar)* (Istanbul 1998).

logian who had reacted against Ebussuud's interpretation of the Sharia and whose books were widely read by both the people and the *ulema*. The preacher Kadızade Mehmed b. Mustafa (1582-1635) turned Birgivî's teachings into an activist movement; his vehement preaching from the Ayasofya Mosque against dervishes led to his famous enmity with the prominent Halveti sheikh Abdülmecid Sivasî (d. 1639).[2] Murad IV did not adopt the Kadızadeli programme against the Sufis and had close relations with Sivasî as well; however, it seems that he used Kadızade's ideas and popularity in order to promote his own measures for public order and the enhancement of the state power.[3] The ban on tobacco and the closing down of coffee-houses by Murad were theoretically based on these ideas.[4] Kadızade himself became close to the Sultan, so that he often functioned as a mediator; for instance, the notables of Kayseri asked for his assistance in 1629/1630,[5] while he played a similar role during the unsuccessful *sipahi* mutiny of 1632.[6] One must not overlook the preachers' competition for well-paid posts in high-class mosques as an underlying factor for the rise of the Kadızadeli movement; both Kadızade and Sivasî, as well as other protagonists of the debate, preached in mosques.[7]

---

2 M. Zilfi, 'The Kadizadelis: Discordant Revivalism in Seventeenth-Century Istanbul', *Journal of Near Eastern Studies*, 45/4 (1986), 251-269; Eadem, *The Politics of Piety: The Ottoman Ulema in the Postclassical Age (1600-1800)* (Minneapolis 1988), 129-181; S. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*. Volume I: *Empire of the Gazis: The Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire, 1280-1808* (Cambridge 1976), 206-207. For primary sources see Kâtib Çelebi, *Fezleke*, Vol. 2 (Istanbul 1287/1870-1871), 155, 182-183; Idem, *Mizanü'l-Hak fi İhtiyari'l-Ahak* (Istanbul 1306/1888-1889), 125-129, 130-133; P. Ricaut, *The History of the Present State of the Ottoman Empire, Containing the Maxims of the Turkish Polity … in Three Books* (London 1686), 243-244, 247. Kâtib Çelebi had been himself a disciple of Kadızade's (*Mizanü'l-Hak*, 130), but maintains a neutral attitude towards the debate with the Halvetis, arguing that no one can really impose on the people changes in their age-old beliefs and practices. On Birgivî, cf. *TDVİA*, s.v. 'Birgivî' (E. Yüksel).

3 Zilfi, 'Kadizadelis', 256-258.

4 Mustafa Naima, *Tarih-i Naima*, Vol. 6 (Istanbul 1282/1865-1866), 231 (and Silâhdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa, *Silâhdar Tarihi*, ed. Ahmed Refik, Vol. 1 [Istanbul 1928], 58), cites a poem of the Kadızadelis' opponents: "It is none of your business to interfere with people's doings / or does tobacco bring doomsday, oh preacher?" ("halkı men eylemeden sana ne girer ne çıkar / vaizâ yoksa duhan ile kıyamet mi kopar"). On Naima's text, cf. now M. İpşirli (ed.), *Naîmâ Mustafa Efendi: Târih-i Na'îmâ (Ravzatü'l-Hüseyn fî Hulâsati Ahbâri'l-Hâfikayn)*, 4 vols (Ankara 2007), who gives in parentheses the slightly different pagination of another six-volume edition (H. 1280).

5 Naima, *Tarih*, 3:46-47.

6 Ibid., 3:91.

7 This is the point made by Zilfi, 'Kadizadelis'. Cf. also A. Saraçgil, 'Generi voluttuari e ragion di stato: politiche repressive del consumo di vino, caffè e tabacco nell'Impero Ottomano nei secc. XVI e XVII', *Turcica*, 28 (1996), 176ff.; Kâtib Çelebi, *Fezleke*, 2:155, 182-183; Idem, *Mizanü'l-Hak*, 125ff.; Naima, *Tarih*, 6:228ff. Both Kâtib Çelebi and Naima argue that the conflict had arisen because of Kadızade and Sivasî's personal ambitions ("tahsil-i şöhret ü şan içün").

A second Kadızadeli wave, which seems to have been the most popular and massive one, made its appearance under the leadership of Üstüvanî Mehmed (d. 1661).[8] In the turmoil of the years after the deposition of İbrahim and during the first years of Mehmed IV's reign, the Kadızadelis attracted large masses of the Istanbul populace, targeting what they perceived as the corruption of society and the state due to irreligious innovations and especially the dervish orders, mainly the Halvetis. Persecution of *tekke*s characterised this period; some measures were imposed during the grand vizierate of Melek Ahmed Paşa (1650-1651), who closed down the Halveti *tekke* in Demirkapı.[9] In 1653, the Kadızadelis managed to have any criticism of Birgivî's main work, the *Tarikat*, forbidden.[10] This second efflorescence of the movement was put to an end, just in its heyday of popular support, by the Grand Vizier Mehmed Köprülü (1656-1661). One of the first acts of this famous statesman was to suppress the Kadızadeli movement, which he perceived as a threat to public order and state power.[11] Üstüvanî, together with several of his followers, was exiled; however, other leaders of the movement remained active. We know that later (1658) many preachers supported Abaza Hasan Paşa, arguing that he would be a better grand vizier than Köprülü.[12]

Finally, during the grand vizierates of Mehmed Köprülü's son Fazıl Ahmed (1661-1676) and his successors, the Kadızadeli movement had its third major wave of influence, under the preacher Mehmed b. Bistam Vanî Efendi (d. 1685). Here again, as in Murad IV's time, influence was due to the personal relations of this Kadızadeli leader, rather than mass participation. Vanî Efendi was very close to Fazıl Ahmed and his successors and succeeded in implementing part of the Kadızadeli programme. He managed to ban taverns and dervish congregations, while in 1666 the ban came to include the ritual dances (*sema*) of the dervishes, and especially the Mevlevis.[13] It seems that this time fundamentalist ideas influenced the state apparatus more deeply; the 'classical' Ottoman legal synthesis, which balanced holy and secular law, tilted toward the former, while regulations based on customary law were abolished. According to eminent scholars, such as Gilles Veinstein, some major changes in the landholding and taxation system, as expressed in various *kanunname*s of the 1670s, should be partly or wholly attributed to the Kadızadeli influence.[14] However, after the failure of the Vienna campaign (1683),

---

8 Zilfi, 'Kadizadelis', 258ff.

9 Ibid., 259; Naima, *Tarih*, 5:56.

10 Kâtib Çelebi, *Fezleke*, 2:383; Naima, *Tarih*, 5:267-272; Zilfi, 'Kadizadelis', 261-263; Eadem, *The Politics of Piety*, 145-146.

11 Naima, *Tarih*, 6:235-236; Silâhdar, *Tarih*, 1:57-59; Zilfi, 'Kadizadelis', 262.

12 Naima, *Tarih*, 6:351.

13 The Mevlevis described this prohibition with the chronogram *yesağ-ı bed* (bad prohibition); A. Gölpınarlı, *Mevlânâ'dan Sonra Mevlevîlik* (Istanbul 1983), 167.

14 U. Heyd, *Studies in Old Ottoman Criminal Law*, ed. V. L. Ménage (Oxford 1973), 152-157; J. Hathaway, 'The Grand Vizier and the False Messiah: The Sabbatai Sevi Controversy and the Ottoman Reform in Egypt', *JAOS*, 117 (1997), 665-671; G. Veinstein, 'On the *Çiftlik* Debate', in Ç. Keyder and F. Tabak (eds), *Landholding and Commercial Agriculture in the Middle East* (Albany 1991), 40; Idem, 'Les règlements fiscaux ottomans de Crète', in A. Anasta-

which had been incited by him, Vanî Efendi was exiled and the 'fundamentalist' movement waned.[15] Nonetheless, various reforms instituted later on, such as the tripartite *cizye* system (1691), continued to be legitimised in terms of a return to the foundations of the holy law.[16]

It is strange that such an important historical movement as the Kadızadelis has been studied so little by Ottomanists. While Ottoman historians themselves have devoted special chapters to the phenomenon, twentieth-century scholars have almost entirely neglected this issue. Eminent historians such as Abdülbaki Gölpınarlı, İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı or Halil İnalcık devoted some pages to the Kadızadelis,[17] but no special study appeared till Ahmet Yaşar Ocak's seminal article back in the early 1980s.[18] Two Ph.D. dissertations written in the same decade were never published.[19] The basic study of the movement was written by Madeline Zilfi, in her classic article on 'Discordant Revivalism' (1986) and

---

sopoulos (ed.), *The Eastern Mediterranean under Ottoman Rule: Crete, 1645-1840. Halcyon Days in Crete VI: A Symposium Held in Rethymno, 13-15 January 2006* (Rethymno 2008), 3-16. On a 'collateral damage' of Vanî's ideas, cf. also M. Sariyannis, 'Aspects of "Neomartyrdom": Religious Contacts, "Blasphemy" and "Calumny" in 17th Century Istanbul', *ArchOtt*, 23 (2005/2006), 249-262, esp. 253.

15 Zilfi, 'Kadizadelis', 263-265; Eadem, *The Politics of Piety*, 147ff.; Gölpınarlı, *Mevlevîlik*, 166-168; Naima, *Tarih*, 6:239-240. However, in 1686 the conflict "between the Kadızadelis and the sheikhs (*tekye şeyhleri*)" was revived in an assembly of *ulema* and sheikhs, while a little later Vanî's son-in-law, Mustafa Efendi, preached against dervishes, causing the reaction of various *ulema* and officials; Silâhdar, *Tarih*, 2:243-244. Even in the 1770s, when nobody spoke of them in Istanbul, there was a Kadızadeli movement in Saraybosna (Sarajevo); see K. Filan, 'Life in Sarajevo in the 18th Century (According to Mulla Mustafa's *Mecmua*)', in V. Costantini and M. Koller (eds), *Living in the Ottoman Ecumenical Community: Essays in Honour of Suraiya Faroqhi* (Leiden and Boston 2008), 335-337.

16 See Silâhdar, *Tarih*, 2:559; Defterdar Sarı Mehmed Paşa, *Zübde-i Vekayiât. Tahlil ve Metin (1066-1116/1656-1704)*, ed. A. Özcan (Ankara 1995), 387; Raşid Efendi, *Tarih-i Raşid*, Vol. 2 (Istanbul 1282/1865), 148. Cf. M. Kiel, 'Remarks on the Administration of the Poll Tax (*Cizye*) in the Ottoman Balkans and Value of Poll Tax Registers (*Cizye Defterleri*) for Demographic Research', *EB*, 1990/4, 84; L. T. Darling, *Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy: Tax Collection and Finance Administration in the Ottoman Empire, 1560-1660* (Leiden 1996), 82-83; Sariyannis, 'Notes on the Ottoman Poll-Tax Reforms of the Late Seventeenth Century: The Case of Crete', *JESHO*, 54 (2011), 39-64.

17 Gölpınarlı, *Mevlevîlik*, 166-168; H. İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600*, trans. N. Itzkowitz and C. Imber (London 1973), 183-185; İ. H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, Vol. 3, Part 1 (Ankara 1951), 363-374. It is striking that neither *EI*² nor *İA* contains any entry on the Kadızadelis proper. In contrast, *TDVİA* has an article by S. Çavuşoğlu, which summarises the current state of research.

18 A. Y. Ocak, 'XVII. Yüzyılda Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Dinde Tasfiye (Puritanizm) Teşebbüslerine Bir Bakış: Kadızâdeliler Hareketi', *Türk Kültürü Araştırmaları*, 17-21/1-2 (1979-1983), 208-225.

19 N. Öztürk, 'Islamic Orthodoxy among the Ottomans in the Seventeenth Century with Special Reference to the Qâdı-zâde Movement', unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Edinburgh, 1981; S. Çavuşoğlu, 'The Kadizâdeli Movement: An Attempt of Şeri'at-Minded Reform in the Ottoman Empire', unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1990.

later in her book on the Ottoman *ulema*.[20] Since then, a few more scholars have dealt with the movement, such as Dina Le Gall or Derin Terzioğlu.[21]

However, all these studies analyse mainly the Kadızadeli movement as an intellectual phenomenon, examining it strictly from the point of view of the history of ideas, the history of Sufism, or the *ulema* institution. Zilfi went a step further by defining it as a field of conflict between low-rank and high-rank *ulema*. In her interpretation, low-rank preachers used the fundamentalist ideas against higher-ranking *ulema* in the fierce struggle for well-paid posts in central Istanbul mosques. Nevertheless, the Kadızadeli phenomenon cries out for a wider social and political interpretation. Historians such as Naima have explicitly described its social base, while the economic and political conditions of the era make it improbable that its followers were not concerned with such preoccupations. In this paper, I will focus on the second period of the Kadızadeli movement, that of c.1650-1656, which was clearly marked by more or less massive popular support for it. My working hypothesis will be that the political factionalism of that time, expressed at two levels at least, that of the palace and that of Istanbul society, had its sides in the Kadızadeli-Halveti conflict as well.[22]

Economical, Social, and Political Conditions in the Mid Seventeenth Century: An Outline

This period was extremely tumultuous for the Ottoman state. After Murad IV's death in 1640, İbrahim's (1640-1648) reign, and especially its later period, was characterised by excessive spending and the dominance of bribery in public offices; İbrahim himself was considered a madman. However, the situation in the capital was relatively calm till 1648, when a revolt by both janissaries and *sipahi*s of Istanbul, supported by the *ulema* as well, resulted in İbrahim's fall and subsequent execution. He was succeeded by his seven-year-old son Mehmed IV, supervised by İbrahim and Murad's mother (*büyük valide*), the famous Kösem Mahpeyker.[23] Soon after, the *sipahi*s mutinied in Istanbul, only to be harsh-

20 Zilfi, 'Kadizadelis'; Eadem, *The Politics of Piety*.

21 See Hathaway, 'The Grand Vizier and the False Messiah'; D. Le Gall, 'Kadızadelis, Nakşbendis and Intra-Sufi Diatribe in Seventeenth-Century Istanbul', *TSAJ*, 28/1-2 (2004), 1-28; C. Kafadar, 'Janissaries and Other Riffraff of Ottoman Istanbul: Rebels Without A Cause?', *IJTS*, 13/1-2 (2007), 113-134; D. Terzioğlu, 'Sufi and Dissident in the Ottoman Empire: Niyâzî-ı Mısrî (1618-1694)', unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1999, 195ff.; Eadem, 'Islamic Puritanism in Service of the Empire: The Kadizadeli Movement Revisited', unpublished paper presented at the 'Ottoman and Atlantic Empires in the Early Modern World' conference held in Istanbul, 19-21 October 2005.

22 I have hinted to this hypothesis in my '"Mob", "Scamps" and Rebels in Seventeenth-Century Istanbul: Some Remarks on Ottoman Social Vocabulary', *IJTS*, 11/1-2 (2005), 11. Terzioğlu, 'Sufi and Dissident', 203-204, has observed that the Kadızadeli conflict "reflected in part the intense factional strife in this period"; the link has also been noted by M. Baer, *Honored by the Glory of Islam: Conversion and Conquest in Ottoman Europe* (Oxford 2008), 69.

23 Kâtib Çelebi, *Fezleke*, 2:327-330; Naima, *Tarih*, 4:301-330. On Kösem's formidable career, see L. Peirce, *The Imperial Harem: Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire* (New

ly suppressed by the janissaries.[24] The strife between *sipahi*s and janissaries continued with Gürcü Nebi revolting in the East and marching to Istanbul, demanding the deposition of the *şeyhülislam* who had permitted the massacre of the rebels.[25] Gürcü Nebi's defeat had as a result that the janissary aghas, led by a triumvirate composed of Bektaş Ağa, Kara Çavuş and *kul kethüdası* Mustafa Ağa (Çelebi Kethüda Beğ), ended in dominating both economic and political life in the capital.[26]

This "Janissary junta", so named by İnalcık,[27] lasted three years. Of course, economic and social problems were intensified; in 1649, residents of Istanbul and Galata were obliged to pay an extraordinary tax (*avarız*) in order for the state to manage to disburse the *sipahi*s' salaries.[28] Various measures were imposed (such as the devaluation of the coinage or a 50% taxation of the *timar*s [*bedel-i timar*][29]), but problems were increased by the domination of trade by the aghas and their wholesale support by Kösem Sultan and the viziers she was promoting. A further cause of the tradesmen's displeasure was an order by the Grand Vizier for the registering of all the residents of Istanbul, obviously to be taxed, in August 1651.[30] A few days later, the 'people of the market' staged a massive protest against Grand Vizier Melek Ahmed Paşa. On the initiative of the guild officials (*yiğitbaşı ve ihtiyarları*), shops were closed and a crowd of tradesmen and artisans pressed the *şeyhülislam* to interfere in their favour. They forced him, almost, to lead them to the imperial palace, where they asked for the dismissal of the Grand Vizier and the execution of the janissary aghas.[31] Only the first demand was granted. However, soon a

York and Oxford 1993), 105ff., 236ff., 248-252, and *passim*; B. Tezcan, 'The Debut of Kösem Sultan's Political Career', *Turcica*, 40 (2008), 347-359.

24 Kâtib Çelebi, *Fezleke*, 2:332-338; Naima, *Tarih*, 4:351-372; *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnâmesi. Topkapı Sarayı Bağdat 304 Yazmasının Transkripsiyonu-Dizini*. 1. Kitap: *İstanbul*, ed. O. Ş. Gökyay (Istanbul 1996), 117, 119. Throughout this paper I use this edition of Evliya (10 vols, eds S. A. Kahraman, Y. Dağlı, R. Dankoff *et alii*, Istanbul 1996-2007).

25 Kâtib Çelebi, *Fezleke*, 2:343-344; *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnâmesi*, 3:47ff.; Ricaut, *Present State*, 21ff.

26 Naima, *Tarih*, 4:382-383. Cf. *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnâmesi*, 1:117; Ricaut, *Present State*, 22.

27 İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire*, 98.

28 Naima, *Tarih*, 4:455.

29 Kâtib Çelebi, *Fezleke*, 2:358-359; Naima, *Tarih*, 5:8. The same historians observe that this measure was a further burden for the *reaya*. Cf. also R. Mantran, 'L'Etat ottoman au XVII^{e} siècle: stabilisation ou déclin?', in Idem (ed.), *Histoire de l'Empire ottoman* (Paris 1989), 237-238.

30 Kâtib Çelebi, *Fezleke*, 2:373; Kara Çelebi-zâde Abdülaziz Efendi, *Ravzatü'l-Ebrâr Zeyli (Tahlil ve Metin)*, ed. N. Kaya (Ankara 2003), 70 ("vezîr-i a'zam umûmen İstanbul mahallât-ı sükkânını tahrîre mübaşeret edüp"); cf. ibid., 226.

31 Kâtib Çelebi, *Fezleke*, 2:373-375; Abdülaziz Efendi, *Ravzatü'l-Ebrâr Zeyli*, 67-73; Naima, *Tarih*, 5:97-106; *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnâmesi*, 1:115 and 3:164-167 (= R. Dankoff [trans. and commentary], *The Intimate Life of an Ottoman Statesman: Melek Ahmed Pasha (1588-1662), as Portrayed in Evliya Çelebi's* Book of Travels *(*Seyahat-name*)*, with a historical introduction by R. Murphey [New York 1991], 77-88); V. Tchentsova, 'Le coup d'état constantinopolitain de 1651 d'après la lettre d'un métropolite grec au tsar russe Alexis Michailovich', *Turcica*, 32 (2000), 399; E. Yi, *Guild Dynamics in Seventeenth-Century Istanbul* (Leiden and

re-arrangement of factions in the palace itself would bring the fall of Kösem Sultan, who was murdered on the incitement of Turhan, mother of Mehmed IV (September 1651). Kösem's fall brought about the fall and death of the janissary aghas, who had been constantly and reciprocally supporting her.[32]

In order to cope with the growing financial problems, the Grand Vizier Tarhoncu Ahmed Paşa (1652-1653) tried some harsh measures: he forced well-to-do officials and subjects to contribute to the treasury, restricted state expenditure, confiscated large estates, and farmed out former *timar*s, taxed mills but also townspeople (starting from Istanbul; the reaction of the inhabitants of Üsküdar called off this plan[33]); finally, he tried to regulate prices.[34] Eventually he made so many enemies that he was dismissed and executed in 1653.[35] His successor, İbşir Paşa, presented himself as a champion of the *sipahi*s, who had not forgotten their massacre by the janissaries in 1648; however, he finally fell victim to an organised reaction by both military corps in 1655.[36] In 1656, *sipahi*s and janissaries rebelled again, and succeeded in having the harem aghas executed; their bodies were hanged from a plane tree.[37] For about two months, till their arrest and execution, the town was under the power of several *sipahi* officers (*meydan ağaları*).[38]

Finally, Turhan was forced to name as Grand Vizier (1656-1661) the aged pasha Mehmed Köprülü, who managed to obtain almost absolute powers in order to restore the Empire, which faced lethal dangers on all fronts. As seen above, Köprülü suppressed the Kadızadeli movement, which he perceived as a grave threat for public order. He also was successful in suppressing a rebellion of the *sipahi*s,[39] who had also some support, accord-

Boston 2004), 213-233. On Melek Ahmed Paşa's relations with the aghas, cf. *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnâmesi*, 3:167, and Ricaut, *Present State*, 23 ("a slave to the lusts of the Janizaries").

32 Naima, *Tarih*, 5:107-116; Tchentsova, 'Le coup d'état', 400ff. According to L. V. Thomas, *A Study of Naima*, ed. N. Itzkowitz (New York 1972), 15, this event constitutes the final failure of the janissaries to claim total power.

33 It was planned that this tax (one or two *guruş* for each household [*menzil*]) would begin from Üsküdar, to be then extended to Galata, Eyüp, and Istanbul. However, the inhabitants of Üsküdar, in an insofar unstudied action, rebelled ("Üsküdar halkı gulüvv-i 'âm edüp"), and eventually the plans were not implemented for fear of massive protests ("hücum-ı âm"); Naima, *Tarih*, 5:252-253.

34 Ibid., 5:225-229, 252-255.

35 Ibid., 5:283ff. Cf. also Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, I:205-206.

36 See Naima, *Tarih*, 6:4-103 for a detailed description of İbşir Paşa's vizierate and fall. Silâhdar, İsazade, and Evliya Çelebi are much more concise. See Silâhdar, *Tarih*, 1:4-11; Z. Yılmazer (ed.), *'Îsâ-zâde Târîhi (Metin ve Tahlîl)* (Istanbul 1996), 17-19; *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnâmesi*, 1:116.

37 The revolt was thus named the 'event of the plane tree' (*vak'a-yı çınar*, or *vak'a-yı vakvakiye*); Naima, *Tarih*, 6:144-155; Silâhdar, *Tarih*, 1:26-30; Yılmazer (ed.), *'Îsâ-zâde Târîhi*, 22-27; J. de Thevenot, *Relation d'un voyage fait au Levant…*, Vol. 1 (Paris 1665), 147-155; Mantran, 'L'Etat ottoman au XVII^{e} siècle', 237ff.

38 Naima, *Tarih*, 6:169-177; Abdülaziz Efendi, *Ravzatü'l-Ebrâr Zeyli*, 254ff.; Silâhdar, *Tarih*, 1:39-41.

39 Naima, *Tarih*, 6:250-257; Silâhdar, *Tarih*, 1:64-67.

ing to the Ottoman chroniclers, from the "commoners" (*avam-ı nâsı*) and "evil-doers and base people from every class" (*her taifeden eşkıya vu erazil*).[40] Finally, Köprülü confronted with success Abaza Hasan Paşa's rebellion in Anatolia.[41] By these moves, but also by his considerable successes against the Venetians, he became so powerful that, on his death, he was succeeded by his own son, Köprülüzade Fazıl Ahmed Paşa (1661-1676), which was an unprecedented phenomenon in Ottoman politics.[42]

A few more words about the economic condition of Istanbul tradesmen are in order here. As seen above, economic problems intensified in the early years of Mehmed IV's reign, especially during the 'sultanate of the aghas'. At the beginning of 1651, the taxes imposed on artisans were so heavy that their crying reached the heavens, states Naima.[43] And he goes on: "Although the Aghas [Kudde Kethüda and Bektaş Beğ] had already raided all the sources of profit belonging to the state, they were still unsated, but coveted even the poor morsels of the needy. They even dared to interfere with the regime of guaranteed market prices (*narh*) … They imposed these goods on the shopkeepers of Istanbul at a price three times their natural value, and refused to allow anyone outside their narrow circle to participate in this profitable trade." The answer to the complaints of the populace was that "This is a city for the rich, not for the poor; if you can't bear the expense, go back to your homes in the provinces (*taşralarda*) and content yourselves with cracked wheat and porridge." It was also said that "a pack of country yokels abandoned their fields and came to enjoy the delights of the city (*bir alay Etrâk çiftlerin bozup gelüp böyle nazenin şehirde zevk idüp*)".[44] According to an almost contemporaneous Armenian source (Eremya Çelebi Kömürcüyan, 1637-1695), "they [i.e., Kara Çavuş, *kul kethüdası* Mustafa Ağa, etc.] were not satisfied with silver, gold, and gifts from all sides, but they began to place imposts of linen and cotton on the guildsmen – from the vizier, whose order it was. Finally they imposed base money on the guildsmen, demanding one gold piece for 120 aspers".[45] In this context, it comes as no surprise that the 'people of the market' revolted

40 Naima, *Tarih*, 6:252; Silâhdar, *Tarih*, 1:64-65. On such terms and their content in the Ottoman sources, see Sariyannis, '"Mob", "Scamps" and Rebels'.

41 Naima, *Tarih*, 6:341-352, 370-394; Silâhdar, *Tarih*, 1:132-139, 144-157. According to Naima, *Tarih*, 6:348, the rebels even asked for an autonomous state in Anatolia.

42 Silâhdar, *Tarih*, 1:219, 221. See ibid., 1:225-226 for a gloomy biography of Köprülü Mehmed Paşa (on the other hand, the same author praises Fazıl Ahmed, in ibid., 1:658-659). Defterdar, *Zübde-i Vekayiât*, 4, 6, is more positive in his appraisal of the old vizier. Greek sources also stress the contrast between the two viziers' personalities; see, for instance, K. N. Sathas, *Mesaionike vivliotheke* [Medieval library], Vol. 3 (Venice 1872), 9. A popular legend recorded in 1675 about Mehmed Köprülü's tomb (saying that incoming rain would be of some use in hell) shows how vivid the memory of the vizier's harsh measures remained; see G. Wheler, *A Journey into Greece in Company of Dr. Spon of Lyon…* (London 1682), 183. On Turhan's choosing of Köprülü, see also Peirce, *The Imperial Harem*, 256-257.

43 Naima, *Tarih*, 5:48 ("hususen ehl-i hirefe haddan ziyade salgunlar salınup fukaranın feryadı asmana çıkdı").

44 Ibid., 5:96-97 (translated by Dankoff, *The Intimate Life*, 28-29). Cf. also Naima, *Tarih*, 5:137, 139, 151; Kâtib Çelebi, *Fezleke*, 2:373.

45 Quoted in Dankoff, *The Intimate Life*, 13.

in 1651 against the aghas and their protector, Melek Ahmed Paşa. Of course, lower strata of the population were also hit by the financial crisis. We read in Naima, for instance, that the *defterdar* Sarı Ali Efendi (d. 1657) became unpopular because he cut the stipends (*vazife*) given to the 'reciters of prayers' (*duagûyan*); these stipends were the only means of sustenance (*rızk*) of many descendants of the Prophet, sheikhs, *ulema*, and poor people (*sadat-ı müstehakkîn ü meşaih-i uzletgezîn ü ulema-yı din ü fukara-yı sabirîn*).[46]

The Social Base of the Kadızadelis and their Alliances

Madeline Zilfi has studied in detail the alliances of both the Kadızadelis and their dervish opponents in the high classes of the *ulema* hierarchy, explaining the debate in terms of social mobility and differentiation between high-rank and low-rank *ulema*. The Halvetis had on their side various high-rank *ulema*; in fact, the *şeyhülislam*s of the era (Zekeriyazade Yahya and Bahaî Mehmed during the reigns of Murad IV and Mehmed IV, respectively) supported them and tried to restrain the Kadızadeli influence. When in 1651 Üstüvanî organised attacks against *tekke*s, the *şeyhülislam*'s reaction was decisive in keeping them under control.[47] At this level, notes Zilfi, the Kadızadeli-Sufi debate was in part a schism in the religious establishment, with the less well-paid and less prominent preachers confronting the higher strata of the *ulema*.[48] Here we should perhaps note that after the final fall of the Kadızadelis, at the end of the seventeenth century, the Halvetis still maintained their influence among the higher *ulema*; for instance, the all-powerful *şeyhülislam* of Mustafa II, the infamous Feyzullah Efendi, was a prominent member of the Halveti order. At the same time, prominent Halvetis participated in the 1703 revolt against Feyzullah.[49] However, what happened in the lower strata of society concerning the Kadızadeli debate remains unexplored. We know that the Halvetis were a very popular dervish order throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries;[50] the massive participation of crowds in the funeral of the former *şeyhülislam* Zekeriyazade Yahya Efendi (d. 1645), an opponent of the Kadızadelis, is indicative of the popular support of the Sufi side.[51]

---

46 Naima, *Tarih*, 6:307ff.

47 Ibid., 5:56-59.

48 Zilfi, 'Kadizadelis', 252. On the social differentiation of the *ulema* and the role it played in these conflicts, cf. S. Faroqhi, 'Social Mobility among the Ottoman *'Ulemâ* in the Late Sixteenth Century', *IJMES*, 4 (1973), 204-218. See also G. Baer, 'Popular Revolt in Ottoman Cairo', *Der Islam*, 54 (1977), 242, on the alliances between lower-rank *ulema* and rebellious crowds in eighteenth-century Cairo.

49 R. A. Abou-El-Haj, *The 1703 Rebellion and the Structure of Ottoman Politics* (Leiden 1984), 35 (but cf. also Le Gall, 'Kadızadelis, Nakşbendis and Intra-Sufi Diatribe', 16-17, on Feyzullah's both Kadızadeli and Naqshbandi connections).

50 See N. Clayer, *Mystiques, état & société. Les Halvetis dans l'aire balkanique de la fin du XV^e^ siècle à nos jours* (Leiden, New York, and Cologne 1994); Eadem, 'La Khalwatiyya (Khalvetiye)', in A. Popovic and G. Veinstein (eds), *Les voies d'Allah. Les ordres mystiques dans le monde musulman des origines à aujourd'hui* (Paris 1996), 484-491.

51 Kâtib Çelebi, *Fezleke*, 2:231-232; Naima, *Tarih*, 4:62. On Zekeriyazade's biography, cf. B.

On the other hand, the second wave of the Kadızadeli movement was also marked by massive popular support. This evolution from an intellectual struggle in the higher strata of the elite into straightforward political activism was based on the obligation for "commanding right and forbidding wrong" (*emr-i ma'ruf ve nehy-i münker*), a central notion in Kadızade's preaching, but also in sixteenth-century political criticism (in Selânikî's work, for instance).[52] Although almost all the sources we have are rather hostile, as they were written mostly after the Kadızadelis' final defeat, one can discern precise information concerning their actual social base. Naima's description of their suppression by Köprülü Mehmed Paşa just after his appointment as Grand Vizier, in 1656, is telling. At this time, the Kadızadelis under Üstüvanî Mehmed were preparing to launch a general attack not only against dervish lodges, but also every innovation. They decided to destroy all *tekke*s, to force – by threatening them with death – all dervishes (*rast geldikleri saçlı ve taclı dervişan fukarasına*) into a renewal of faith, and to march to the Sultan himself, in order to ask for the banning of every innovation (*bid'at*). From among the Kadızadelis, students (*suhte*) were armed with knives and cudgels; however, the bulk of the crowd seems to have been craftsmen and merchants: "the craftsmen and profiteers (*muhtekir ve mera'i-i sukı ve ehl-i hiref kısmından*) Hacı Mandal and Faki Döngel armed their middlemen, apprentices and servants, the Cossack hetman fools (*matrabazları şagerdleri ve köleleri olan hotman-ı Kazak kakumları*)".[53] As the armed crowd was marching towards the Fatih Mosque, where Üstüvanî was a preacher, Köprülü Mehmed summoned a council of high-rank *ulema* and arrested the leaders of the movement, exiling them to Cyprus.[54]

Elsewhere, Naima describes even more explicitly the social base of the Kadızadelis, although with an obviously hostile attitude. He states that most of the common people (*avam-ı nâsdan ekseri*) supported the movement, as the issues it had posed were discussed everywhere. He claims that, while most dervish sheikhs were truly indifferent to material goods, the Kadızadelis, who in theory preached asceticism and abstinence, fascinated mostly "wicked usurers, stock-piling profiteers, and untrustworthy people of the market" (*murabahacı habisleri ve muhtekir navluncular ve ehl-i sukdan mera'i kallaşları*), who

Kellner-Heinkele (ed.), *Devhatü l-Meşâyih. Einleitung und Edition*, Vol. 2 (Stuttgart 2005), 81-85; Terzioğlu, 'Sufi and Dissident', 229-230.

52 Cf. Kâtib Çelebi, *Mizanü'l-Hak*, 91-96; Zilfi, 'Kadizadelis', 255; Eadem, *The Politics of Piety*, 137ff.; M. Cook, *Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought* (Cambridge 2000), esp. 316ff.

53 These names (meaning respectively 'latch, door bar' and 'medlar' [the fruit]) must be fictitious; cf. similar uses of such names in *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnâmesi*, 1:223; Y. Yücel (ed.), *Osmanlı Devlet Teşkilâtına Dair Kaynaklar* (Ankara 1988), 93, 111, 118 (although B. Tezcan, 'The "Kânûnnâme of Mehmed II": A Different Perspective', in K. Çiçek [ed.-in-chief], *The Great Ottoman-Turkish Civilisation*. Volume 3: *Philosophy, Science and Institutions* [Ankara 2000], 664-665 n. 54, identifies the names mentioned with real personalities). Terzioğlu, 'Sufi and Dissident', 205, translates the passage as "pedlars of medlar".

54 Naima, *Tarih*, 6:235-236; cf. Zilfi, 'Kadizadelis', 262; Zilfi, *The Politics of Piety*, 146-147. Terzioğlu, 'Sufi and Dissident', 205, rightly points out Rycaut's mentioning of "Russians and other sort of Renegado Christians" in connection to Naima's "Cossacks". Cf. below, n. 57.

saw in ascetic abstinence and piety a fraudulent way to make profit (*zühd ve tekva suretinden görünmeği dünya tahsiline dam-ı tezvir edüb*) and used their supporters among the elite, pashas and *kadı*s, in order to gain control of waqfs and other estates, while they also "would enter into agreements with rich people" (*hileler öğredüp ol-makule maldar kimseleri kavla alup*) in order to make dubious transactions. Moreover, Naima mentions students (*suhte*) among the Kadızadeli supporters, while the movement also gained support in the palace court and among the imperial guards (*bostancı*). According to the expression of a contemporary *ulema*, the Kadızadeli movement resembled a tree; one branch was the imperial guards (*bostancı*, *baltacı*) and its roots were the whole of the market people (*âmme-yi ehl-i suka*). At least one of Üstüvanî's famous supporters was, again according to Naima, Uşşakîoğlu Macuncu Hamza, obviously a merchant and "one of the wealthiest people of the time" (*mütemevvil-i cihan*).[55] Moreover, Üstüvanî is said to have attracted his supporters in the palace because his lessons were "a suitable means for acquiring wealth" (*kimi dersin okuyub tahsil-i dünyaya münasib vesiledir deyü ihtilat ve ittihad edüb*).[56] Paul Rycaut (1629-1700), who lived in Istanbul in the early 1660s, speaks of merchant Kadızadelis as well: "The Sect of Kadizadeli … is of a melancholy and Stoical temper … These are for the most part Tradesmen, whose sedentary life affords opportunity and nutriment to a melancholy, and distempered fancy".[57] Other historians, however, namely, Vecihî Hasan Efendi (d. 1670) and Fındıklılı Silâhdar Mehmed Ağa (1658-1726/1727), only mention "commoners" (*avam-ı nâsdan ekseri*).[58] It seems to me, however, that Naima's description, which I think is quite reliable, points to support by middle or even upper mercantile strata, rather than "common folk, petty tradesmen of every sort and the urban labor force, marginally affiliated to the shops and marketplaces" (Zilfi);[59]

---

55 Naima, *Tarih*, 6:232-234, 240. On Macuncu Hamza and other followers of Üstüvanî in the palace, ibid., 5:55; cf. Öztürk, 'Islamic Orthodoxy', 234, 252; Çavuşoğlu, 'The Kadizâdeli Movement', 125. Naima's former passages belong to himself, and not to his known sources; see Thomas, *A Study of Naima*, 106-110, 131. Naima also mentions some obscure people (*kâğıd emini* Hüseyin, Zihgirci Süleyman, Arab Abdurrahman, and others) who inflamed the controversy by exaggerating calumnies from the one camp to the other; Naima, *Tarih*, 5:55 (cf. Öztürk, 'Islamic Orthodoxy', 237; Çavuşoğlu, 'The Kadizâdeli Movement', 125-126).

56 Naima, *Tarih*, 6:233. This could just mean that he had the right connections in order to distribute posts and stipends. Thomas, *A Study of Naima*, 108, renders the passage as follows: "representatives of all these corps [palace halberdiers, gardeners, and gatemen] frequented the ulemas' lectures, and it came to be said that such and such a man had made his fortune 'in class'".

57 Ricaut, *Present State*, 247 (he seems to confuse their practices with the dervish *zikr*, however). Elsewhere he describes them as "Russians and other sort of Renegado Christians" (ibid., 244). Cf. above, n. 54.

58 B. Atsız, *Das osmanische Reich um die Mitte des 17. Jahrhunderts. Nach den Chroniken des Vecihi (1637-1660) und des Mehmed Halifa (1633-1660)* (Munich 1977), fol. 70r; Silâhdar, *Tarih*, 1:58. Mehmed Halife, for his part, does not mention the Kadızadelis at all (see Atsız, *Das osmanische Reich*).

59 Zilfi, *The Politics of Piety*, 140; cf. İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire*, 184 ("they found most of their support among the poor medrese students and humble tradesmen"); J. E. Mandaville, 'Usurious Piety: The Cash-Waqf Controversy in the Ottoman Empire', *IJMES*, 10 (1979), 289-

I would argue that the latter were used as a fighting force by the merchants, being their servants or apprentices. A similar picture, though focusing on lower strata of the market, emerges from the description of the 1651 revolt by Evliya: "a pack of jackals and grocers and hoarders, saddlers and silk mercers and linen drapers, camel drivers and porters. They aren't about to risk their lives. Not one can go without his Ismehan or his Ümmehan…".[60] In fact, some references show the common folk of Istanbul rallying around the Halvetis as well (I will revert below to this issue). The Kadızadelis seem to have maintained some of their social base later on; according to Terzioğlu, during the 'third wave' of the movement's influence, its leader Vanî Efendi had strong "mercantile connections".[61]

Now, as seen above, in the early 1650s, considered as the time span of the 'second wave' of the Kadızadeli movement, the dominant political conflicts were: on the one hand, the palace factions of Turhan v. Kösem Sultan; on the other, the 'junta' of the janissary aghas (1648-1651) v. the 'people of the market', who were severely hit by the economic crisis and the interference of the aghas in trade, as described above.[62] Kösem's faction was

---

308 and particularly 307 ("right wing street rabble"). Elsewhere, Zilfi (*The Politics of Piety*, 189) calls the Kadızadeli crowds "often little more than raging mobs" and notes rightly, I believe, that they "were always a small minority within the population[; t]heir strength lay in a strident offensive rather than in numbers". Yi, *Guild Dynamics*, 38 n. 86, follows Çavuşoğlu's conclusion that "we cannot draw a direct connection between the movement and the social strata of tradesmen", although she is almost the only scholar to note Naima's report on merchant followers of the movement (ibid., 38 n. 87 and 230 n. 247; cf. also Terzioğlu, 'Sufi and Dissident', 202-203). I cannot agree with Çavuşoğlu's conclusion that "Naima describes [the Kadızadelis'] followers as jobless, idle and brawling people" ('The Kadizâdeli Movement', 33).

60 *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnâmesi*, 3:165 (translated by Dankoff, *The Intimate Life*, 82-83). The original goes: "bir alay çakkal u bakkal ve muhtekir sarraç ve gazzâz ve bezzâz ve cemmâl u hammâl kavimlerdir". Similar descriptions of other mutinying crowds lack any such references to profiteers or high-status merchants; see, for instance, Sariyannis, '"Mob", "Scamps" and Rebels', 11-14.

61 Terzioğlu is currently undertaking relevant research (personal communication, 26 February 2008; cf. Terzioğlu, 'Sufi and Dissident', 344). Vanî's attacks against non-Muslim minorities and foreign powers might have risen from the latter's ongoing dominance in Ottoman trade; cf. Zilfi, *The Politics of Piety*, 152. This anti-Frankish dimension of the movement could offer an intriguing line of thought and a further argument for the 'free-trade' connotations of the Kadızadeli 'third wave'.

62 The janissaries seem to have risen as allies of the guilds throughout the eighteenth century; see R. W. Olson, 'The Esnaf and the Patrona Halil Rebellion of 1730: A Realignment in Ottoman Politics?', *JESHO*, 17 (1974), 329-344; Idem, 'Jews, Janissaries, Esnaf and the Revolt of 1740 in Istanbul: Social Upheaval and Political Realignment in the Ottoman Empire', *JESHO*, 20 (1977), 185-207; S. Faroqhi, 'Crisis and Change, 1590-1699', in H. İnalcık with D. Quataert (eds), *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge 1994), 593-595; B. McGowan, 'The Age of the *Ayan*s, 1699-1812', in ibid., 640; D. Quataert, 'Janissaries, Artisans and the Question of Ottoman Decline, 1730-1826', in Idem, *Workers, Peasants and Economic Change in the Ottoman Empire, 1730-1914* (Istanbul 1993), 197-203. On the other hand, janissaries had started entering the guilds at least from the beginning of the seventeenth century; Yi, *Guild Dynamics*, 132-143. However, as Kafadar notes, "the esnafization of the Janissaries in Istanbul took place not at the level of the guilds but at that of the "lumpenesnaf"…";

relying on the aghas' power, while Turhan's final victory in 1651 also marked their fall. The links of the Kadızadelis with the 'people of the market' were clearly shown above; it remains to see whether this alliance had more intense connections with all the political and economic conflicts of the time. Unfortunately, I have not been able to locate any reference to straightforward involvement of the Kadızadelis in the 1651 revolt; however, there are some interesting indications that point to a link between the two movements. Another description of the protestors of 1651 by Evliya, for instance, presents striking similarities with his own descriptions of individual Kadızadelis: "… a group of the protestors, which included the guild elders, the pious *şeyh*s, the *seyyid*s with their kohl-shaded eyes, their toothpicks in their turbans, and their prayer-beads in their hands, and also some crass-spoken and dull-minded rowdies" (*bir alay ihtiyârları ve dindâr meşâyihleri ve mükehhal gözlü, başı mısvâklı, eli tesbihli sâdâtları ve acı sözlü söz anlamaz bî-dâdları*).[63] Even if this is only Evliya's formulaic technique, the fact that he describes Kadızadelis and revolting artisans in the same way shows that in his mind he was associating them. Also of some significance may be Evliya's reference to the words that an emissary of Melek Ahmed Paşa cried to the 1651 rebels: "Why have you gathered for this sedition? Didn't Kadi-zade preach every Friday from the pulpit of this very Aya Sofya, and wasn't that the reason the coffeehouses were closed and public gatherings were forbidden?"[64] If he really meant to influence the rebellious tradesmen, he should have taken into account that they respected Kadızade and his ideas. Paul Rycaut, for his part, seems to imply that the Kadızadelis abhorred especially the janissaries, due to their allegiance to the Bektashi order.[65]

---

moreover, "relations between the rebels and the guilds were never free of tension because of the issue of lumpenesnaf and because, after all, prolonged upheaval is bad for business" (Kafadar, 'Janissaries and Other Riffraff', 125). An early example of a janissary shopkeeper, in whose defence the janissaries manage the dismissal of the judge of Istanbul, was recorded in 1657; see Naima, *Tarih*, 6:270, 307; Silâhdar, *Tarih*, 1:74-75; Yılmazer (ed.), *'Îsâ-zâde Târîhi*, 106, and cf. Zilfi, *The Politics of Piety*, 92-93; R. Murphey, 'Forms of Differentiation and Expression of Individuality in Ottoman Society', *Turcica*, 34 (2002), 141.

63 Dankoff, *The Intimate Life*, 81; *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnâmesi*, 3:164. Cf., for instance, similar descriptions of Kadızadelis in *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnâmesi*, 1:286 ("bir alay bıyığı traş, başı misvâklı ve gözleri sürmeli tâ'ife-i Kâdızâde'lidir"), 3:50 ("gözü sürmeli ve başı misvâklı, eli mercân tesbîhli Kadızâde tarîkinden geçinür şahıs"). The strange appearance of the Kadızadelis ("'aceb kuş kıyâfetli Kadızâdeler") is also hinted at by a late-seventeenth or early-eighteenth-century anonymous author: H. Develi (ed.), *XVIII. Yüzyıl İstanbul Hayatına Dair Risâle-i Garîbe* (Istanbul 2001), 20; cf. also S. Salgırlı, 'Manners and Identity in Late Seventeenth Century Istanbul', unpublished M.A. thesis, Sabancı University, 2003, 33. The fact that the Kadızadelis shaved their moustache is also pointed out in Naima, *Tarih*, 6:237.

64 *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnâmesi*, 3:166 (translated by Dankoff, *The Intimate Life*, 85). Just before the revolt, the Kadızadelis were assembling in the house of *koz bekçisi* Potur Hüseyin, who had been driven away from the janissary corps ("ocakdan matrud"); Naima, *Tarih*, 5:57.

65 Ricaut, *Present State*, 284: "… this Order [the Bektashi] is the most abhorred in the World by the Kadızadeli, because that Bectash left it to the free will of his Disciples, either to observe the constant hours of prayer, or not; by which great liberty and licentiousness is entred amongst the Janizaries".

It is interesting to note here that the *şeyhülislam* Karaçelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi, who, according to Evliya, incited the merchant protestors of 1651,[66] seems to have been supported by the Kadızadelis in order to take the place of his predecessor and their opponent, Bahaî Efendi, in May 1651, a few months before the *ehl-i suk* incident in August.[67] The story as told by Naima is illuminating for the complexity of alliances in this era of turmoil: Abdülaziz Efendi was trying hard to gain the friendship of Bektaş Ağa; however, the latter was inclined towards Bahaî Efendi. Finally, Bahaî's *fetva* about tobacco made Bektaş Ağa "and the other tasteless men who did not smoke" turn against him. Moreover, Bahaî refused to comply with the aghas' interference in state affairs. When the latter decided to remove him and propose Abdülaziz Efendi, Kösem stated that he was her enemy (*bilahare Valide Sultan hazretlerinden Aziz bizim katilimiz ve düşmen-i devletimizdir deyü cevab gelüb*),[68] but finally the aghas' proposal was accepted. Although Naima implies in other parts of his work as well that he was friendly to the aghas,[69] Abdülaziz himself describes the 1651 revolt somewhat favourably in his chronicle, making a clear distinction between those who originally began the protest and "various base people who did not know what the cause of the assembly was" (*içlerinde ecnâs-ı muhtelife olup bâis-i cem'iyyet ne idüğün bilmez erâzil olmagın*).[70] His Kadızadeli sympathies may be traced in his calling "evil innovation" (*bid'at-ı seyyi'e*) the unjust new taxes, which were imposed on tradesmen and were "obstructing the movement of merchants" (*bu bid'at-ı seyyi'e-i ihdasî amed-şüd-i tüccâr insidâdına ba'is olur*),[71] as well as in his obsession against Ebu Said Efendi (an ally of the Halvetis)[72] and, of course, Bahaî Efendi, whom he blames explicitly for the use of tobacco and drugs.[73] On the other hand, he seems to disregard totally the Kadızadelis and Üstüvanî; when talking of Köprülü Mehmed Paşa's elevation to the grand vizierate, he does not mention at all his confrontation with Üstüvanî, although he insists that Köprülü "utterly disturbed the line of promotion" in the *ulema* hierarchy and that he "did not make a single arrangement beneficial for religion or the state".[74]

---

66 *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnâmesi*, 3:164 (= Dankoff, *The Intimate Life*, 82).

67 This seems to be implied by Naima, *Tarih*, 5:56, 62ff. On his biography, see İ. H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, Vol. 3, Part 2 (Ankara 1954), 470-472; Kellner-Heinkele (ed.), *Devhatü l-Meşâyih*, 2:101-103. The biographer Mustakimzade (ibid., 2:103) describes him as a "zealot" ("ta'assub-meşreb"), a word usually linked with the Kadızadelis; on the contrary, his opponent Bahaî is called "dervish-minded" ("sufi-meşreb") (ibid., 2:101).

68 On the enmity between Abdülaziz Efendi and Kösem, cf. Peirce, *The Imperial Harem*, 247-248, 251-252. On his enmity against Bahaî Efendi, as well as the aghas' role in the latter's removal, cf. Kellner-Heinkele (ed.), *Devhatü l-Meşâyih*, 2:99.

69 Naima, *Tarih*, 5:144-145.

70 Abdülaziz Efendi, *Ravzatü'l-Ebrâr Zeyli*, 67ff.

71 Ibid., 68, 184-185.

72 See, for instance, ibid., 97, 114, 116-117, 122, 195, 204.

73 Ibid., 165ff.

74 Ibid., 288-289. His complaints must be linked with the fact that he did not manage to get the much-desired post of *şeyhülislam* again. A similar example of a high-ranking *ulema*'s ambiguous stance against the Kadızadelis is Murad IV's *şeyhülislam* Yahya Efendi; see Le Gall, 'Kadızadelis, Nakşbendis and Intra-Sufi Diatribe', 18-19.

If the tradesmen's revolt in 1651 was linked somehow to the Kadızadeli milieu, the former's opponents, i.e., the aghas dominating Istanbul politics at the time, seem to have taken the side of the dervish fraternities. Here the evidence is more concrete and the connection safer. Although there are references to janissary followers of Üstüvanî,[75] it is clear that the janissary aghas were close to the Halveti order, i.e., the main ideological opponents of the Kadızadelis. The most prominent agha, Bektaş Ağa, although depicted by Abdülaziz Efendi and Naima as an enemy of smoking, represented himself as a Sufi and a disciple of Sivasî.[76] Another member of the 'junta' triumvirate, *kul kethüdası* Çelebi Kethüda Beğ, was also a follower of the Halveti sheikh Ömer Efendi and actively helped the Sufi side, forcing the Grand Vizier to annul the order which permitted the Kadızadelis to demolish dervish lodges (1651).[77] In addition, the aghas' protector Kösem Sultan was very generous towards the Halvetis and had built Sivasî's tomb.[78] Later on, on the contrary, her opponent Turhan seems to have been favourable towards Üstüvanî's preaching, with the result that after Kösem's death and for four years, until the fall of the harem aghas, in 1656, the Kadızadelis virtually dominated palace politics.[79] According to a late seventeenth-century chronicle, *Risale-i Kürt Hatib*, it was Turhan together with Köprülü Fazıl Ahmed Paşa who insisted on bringing Vanî Efendi to the palace, which means that she continued to support the Kadızadeli preachers even after the suppression of the movement in 1656.[80] More generally, Cemal Kafadar has described the Kadızadeli movement as a reaction against "the new urban reality", a reality which promoted the sociability of the "Janissary-affiliated social class".[81]

It seems, then, that at least for the early 1650s we can establish a general pattern of conflicts and alliances in the way that I have pointed out above: at the palace level, Kösem's v. Turhan's faction; at the level of the power conflict in the streets of Istanbul, janissary aghas v. merchants and other tradesmen; finally, at the ideological level, Halveti followers v. Kadızadelis.

---

75 Naima, *Tarih*, 5:55-56. Cf. also R. Dankoff, *An Ottoman Mentality: The World of Evliya Çelebi* (Leiden and Boston 2004), 70-71; Kafadar, 'Janissaries and Other Riffraff', 126.

76 Naima, *Tarih*, 5:139 ("Sivasî şeyhden biatli olmağla ehl-i tasavvufa âmmiyane taklid ederdi"). See also below, n. 95, for his Bayrami/Hamzevi connections. According to Ricaut, *Present State*, 249, the aghas were devout Bektashis; probably he was misled by the term *taife-i bektaşiyan*, which signifies the janissaries (cf. also Kafadar, 'Janissaries and Other Riffraff', 126).

77 Naima, *Tarih*, 5:57.

78 Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, 3/1:358-359 n. 2; Zilfi, *The Politics of Piety*, 139; Peirce, *The Imperial Harem*, 210. Cf. also J. von Hammer-Purgstall, *Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches*, Vol. 5 (Budapest 1829), 547, on other benefactions of Kösem to Halveti lodges.

79 Naima, *Tarih*, 6:233 ("Üstüvanî Efendi'nin mu'takad-i âmme-i nâs olduğı darü's-saade ağasına ve anlardan Valide Sultan hazretlerine ifade olunub"), 234; cf. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, 3/1:371-372.

80 I wish to thank Cemal Kafadar, who is currently preparing this valuable text for publication and kindly shared this information with me. Cf. also E. Afyoncu, 'Osmanlı Siyasî Tarihinin Ana Kaynakları: Kronikler', *Türkiye Araştırmaları Literatür Dergisi*, 1/2 (2003), 143-144; Terzioğlu, 'Sufi and Dissident', 131 and n. 111.

81 Kafadar, 'Janissaries and Other Riffraff', 120-122.

Kösem	Turhan
Janissary aghas	Merchants and artisans
Halvetis	Kadızadelis

Some Cautionary Remarks

Obviously, the situation actually was much more complicated than this simple, bilateral model would suggest. For one thing, one must take into account the long-standing conflict between janissaries and *kapıkulu sipahi*s, a conflict which culminated, as seen above, with the janissary suppression of a *sipahi* rebellion in 1648 and the short-lived *sipahi* dictatorship in Istanbul after the 'event of the plane tree' in 1656. The relations between the two groups were fluctuating, even passing from conflict to joint mutinies after the middle of the century (1655, 1656, 1687-1688).[82] An analysis of the role of the *sipahi*s in Istanbul politics would be very useful and thought-provoking, but for reasons of space it cannot be undertaken here. Suffice it to note the difference between the 'rebellion practice' of the janissaries and the *sipahi*s when ruling the imperial capital. While, as we saw above, the janissary aghas tried to dominate Istanbul economic life by regulating prices, imposing monopolies, and investing in commercial enterprises, the *sipahi meydan ağaları* in 1656 roamed in groups of 50 or 60 pillaging houses and stores, while also trying to establish a client network based on occasional favours.[83] This observation would imply that, unlike the 'mercantile' attitude of the janissaries, who by then knew the opportunities presented by controlling the city trade, the *sipahi*s had more of a 'robber' or at least military mentality concerning their rule. At any rate, the relationship of the *kapıkulu sipahi*s with the Kadızadeli movement and palace politics remains to be explored; they surely have to enter the equation, but one still wonders how.

Secondly, such schematic models obviously have to be moderated by emphasis on the existence of multiple factions, segments, and alliances across their bilateral patterns. Let us recall the story related above about Karaçelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi, a Kadızadeli sympathiser and personal enemy of their chief *ulema* opponent Bahaî Efendi, as well as of Kösem, but with shifting alliances with the aghas; also, Bahaî's conflict with the aghas. There also are some references to Kadızadeli preachers who had friendly relations with the janissary 'junta'. A certain Deli Şeyh was "relying on the aghas" (*ocak ağalarına müstenid olmağla*), while Şeyh Veli Efendi, a preacher in the Fatih Mosque, is described as "a counsellor of the aghas" (*ocak ağalarının müsteşarı*).[84] This Veli Efendi seems to

82 Naima, *Tarih*, 6:84-85 (with an interesting description of a common meeting of the two groups), 146-147; Silâhdar, *Tarih*, 2:301-349.

83 Naima, *Tarih*, 6:170 ("nâdanlar ol süfehanın kapularına mülâzemete başlayup … peşkeş ile gelüp … malların aldıkları âdemin işi elbette suret bulsun deyü"). Compare the situation during the rule of rebel *sipahi*s and janissaries in the winter of 1687-1688; Silâhdar, *Tarih*, 2:302 (client networks) and 299, 311, 335 (pillage).

84 Naima, *Tarih*, 5:55, 59. We cannot preclude the possibility that these two preachers were the same person, which can be explained by some scribe having confused the letters *vav* and *dal*; Naima's mentioning of Deli Şeyh without any introduction or explanation reinforces this hypothesis.

have been a prominent person in the palace; he was summoned by the aghas in 1651 (just before their fall), together with the *şeyhülislam* and other high-ranking *ulema*, while in May 1655, when the janissaries asked for Grand Vizier İbşir Paşa's removal and execution, the Sultan sent to them Veli Efendi, because he had friendly relations with everyone, including "wealthy merchants" (*mütemevvilan-ı tüccar*) and janissaries. For this reason, the *ulema* called him mockingly Veli Ağa.[85] These facts may appear contradictory in relation to the pattern of alliances that I propose (although the mention of wealthy merchants favours my hypothesis). But in reality they may only show that the political situation was not straightforwardly 'bilateral'; people often changed sides, on the basis of personal motivations or opportunistic considerations. Strictly bilateral models, at any rate, usually fail to take into account the complexities of social, political and personal relationships in history.[86] After all, a recent study by Dina Le Gall showed that prominent Kadızadeli preachers had their own Sufi connections as well, mainly among the Naqshbandis.[87]

Moreover, the question of the social base of the Halvetis is puzzling in this context. We saw that the Halvetis also enjoyed massive support among the populace of Istanbul, and sources like the diary of the Sünbüli (a branch of the Halvetis) dervish Seyyid Hasan (1620-1688; the diary covers the years 1661 to 1665) show merchants and artisans from various occupations, but also numerous low-to-mid-level members of the military, affiliated to the order.[88] The situation becomes even more complicated if we consider the case of the Bayrami order (after 1561 known also as Hamzevi), a branch of the Melami, whose followers mainly belonged to the lower merchant and artisan class within the guilds.[89] A prerequisite of the order was that every member should earn his own living (*kedd-i yemin*), while its organisation and ritual had similarities with those of the tradesmen's guilds.[90]

---

85 Kâtib Çelebi, *Fezleke*, 2:372; Naima, *Tarih*, 6:93.

86 As Abou-El-Haj puts it (*The 1703 Rebellion*, 1), in defining the *Edirne vak'ası*, we have to do with "a struggle between coalitions of factions drawn from various groups – a struggle between composites"; on a different bilateral model, see J. Hathaway, 'Bilateral Factionalism in the Ottoman Provinces', in A. Anastasopoulos (ed.), *Provincial Elites in the Ottoman Empire. Halcyon Days in Crete V: A Symposium Held in Rethymno, 10-12 January 2003* (Rethymno 2005), 31-38.

87 Le Gall, 'Kadızadelis, Nakşbendis and Intra-Sufi Diatribe'; on the various dervish fraternities in relation to the Kadızadelis, see also Terzioğlu, 'Sufi and Dissident', 234ff.

88 C. Kafadar, 'Self and Others: The Diary of a Dervish in Seventeenth-Century Istanbul and First-Person Narratives in Ottoman Literature', *SI*, 69 (1989), 121-150, esp. 142; Idem, 'Janissaries and Other Riffraff', 126; O. Ş. Gökyay, 'Sohbetnâme', *Tarih ve Toplum*, 3 (1985), 128-136, esp. 133. It is interesting to note that Seyyid Hasan also notes his visit to Köprülü Mehmed Paşa's tomb with a group of his brethren (Kafadar, 'Self and Others', 145), not surprisingly since the deceased statesman had virtually saved the dervishes from Üstüvanî's massive and final pogrom in 1656. Seyyid Hasan had also personal relations with Melek Ahmed Paşa, the protagonist of the 1651 incident; Gökyay, 'Sohbetnâme', 131.

89 This applies mostly (but not only) to the first half of the sixteenth century, under the leadership of Oğlan Şeyh İsmail-i Maşûkî (Çelebi Şeyh, d. 1538). See İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire*, 191-193; Ocak, *Zındıklar ve Mülhidler*, 258-268, 274-290; C. Imber, 'The Malâmatiyya in the Ottoman Empire', in Idem, *Studies in Ottoman History and Law* (Istanbul 1996), 145-152 (= *EI*^{2}, s.v. 'Malâmatiyya. In Ottoman Turkey').

90 Ocak, *Zındıklar ve Mülhidler*, 257-258. See also S. F. Ülgener, *Dünü ve Bugünü İle Zihni-*

The Bayrami sheikh İdris-i Muhtefî or Şeyh Aliyy-i Rumî (d. 1615), a merchant himself, lived in various towns under different names, and could not be arrested (though wanted as heretical), till his death.[91] Now, there are some indications that the Halvetis had also opened a second front against the Bayramis (Hamzevis). Sivasî Efendi, Kadızade's great enemy, together with another Halveti sheikh, Ömer Efendi, had publicly accused İdris-i Muhtefî of heresy and atheism (*ilhad ve zendeka*),[92] while one of Vanî Efendi's greatest opponents, Niyazî-i Mısrî (1618-1694), closely related to the Halvetis, vehemently attacked the Hamzevis, i.e., the Bayramis: "I could be anything, an ignoramus, a sinner, a mischief-maker, an imbecile, a donkey, a dog, a cat, or a pig, but God forbid that I should be a Hamzevi".[93] Furthermore, in the rebellion of 1656 against the harem aghas, supporters of the Kadızadelis, the Bayrami sheikh Himmet Efendi hid in his house a certain Abro (or should we read Ebru?) Çelebi, for whose arrest the revolting janissaries and *sipahi*s had managed to get a sultanic order.[94] Nonetheless, in other instances the Hamzevis/Bayramis appear associated with the janissary aghas;[95] according to Halil İnalcık, moreover, the Bayramis expressed the popular hostility against merchants and the capitalist mentality in general.[96] After all, the bilateral conflict of the Halvetis v. fundamentalist ideas in

---

yet ve Din. İslam, Tasavvuf ve Çözülme Devri İktisat Ahlâkı (Istanbul 1981), 80-87; M. Kara, 'Melâmetiye', *İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası*, 43/1-4 (1987), 586ff.

91 Kâtib Çelebi, *Fezleke*, 1:373; Ocak, *Zındıklar ve Mülhidler*, 310-313; Imber,'Malâmatiyya', 149-150. It is noteworthy that the Halveti dervish Enfî Hasan Hulûs Çelebi, a great admirer of Niyazî-i Mısrî, includes in his work a biography of İdris; M. Tatcı and M. Yıldız (eds), *Enfî Hasan Hulûs Halvetî: "Tezkiretü'l-Müteahhirîn". XVI.-XVIII. Asırlarda İstanbul Velîleri ve Delileri* (Istanbul 2007), 161-164.

92 Kâtib Çelebi, *Fezleke*, 1:373; Imber, 'Malâmatiyya', 149-150. Ömer Efendi (d. 1624) had been the spiritual guide of no less a person than Kadızade himself, before the latter rejected Sufism (Zilfi, 'Kadizadelis', 252).

93 H. Çeçen (ed.), *Niyazî-i Mısrî'nin Hatıraları* (Istanbul 2006), 79 (also 40, 42-43, 85 and *passim*); cf. Ocak, *Zındıklar ve Mülhidler*, 304. Niyazî launches violent attacks to contemporaneous sultans, calling them Jews and Hamzevis, and even stating that the sultanate would be better belonging to the Tatar Muslims (Niyazî had close relations with Selim Giray of Crimea); Çeçen (ed.), *Niyazî-i Mısrî'nin Hatıraları*, 99-100, 115, 142-143 (cf. also his saying to his oppressors: "I showed you two ordeals by God, and now you show me an order by the Sultan!"; ibid., 78). However, we should note that one of Niyazî's disciples, Abdal Çelebi, was a merchant himself (and a rich one, since he founded a lodge for his spiritual guide in 1669); ibid., 20. On Niyazî and his diary, see Terzioğlu, 'Sufi and Dissident'; Eadem, 'Man in the Image of God in the Image of the Times: Sufi Self-Narratives and the Diary of Niyâzî-i Mısrî (1618-94)', *SI*, 94 (2002), 139-165.

94 Yılmazer (ed.), *'Îsâ-zâde Târîhi*, 26. On the possibility of an 'alliance' between the Bayramis and the Kadızadelis, cf. also Terzioğlu, 'Sufi and Dissident', 236-243.

95 In 1651, a Hamzevi dervish hid Bektaş Ağa, suspected also of being a Hamzevi himself although a disciple of Sivasî Efendi as well (Naima, *Tarih*, 5:135, 139). See also Ocak, *Zındıklar ve Mülhidler*, 304-305, on the relations of the Melami/Hamzevi sheikh Sütçü (Lebenî) Beşir Ağa (executed in 1661/1662, during the vizierate of Köprülüzade Fazıl Ahmed Paşa) with the aghas, as well as on the infiltration of the janissary corps with his ideas in general.

96 H. İnalcık, 'Capital Formation in the Ottoman Empire', *The Journal of Economic History*, 19 (1969), 104; reprinted in Idem, *The Ottoman Empire: Conquest, Organization and Economy. Collected Studies* (London 1978).

general was even more blurred before the emergence of Kadızade Efendi, especially in the provinces. The example of Münirî Belgradî (1551 or 1552-c.1620), a Halveti sheikh of Belgrade who wrote a study on guilds in the *futuwwa* tradition, but also against dancing, coffee, wine, opium, and tobacco, illustrates this point.[97] It is interesting to note here that when he wrote to the Sufi leaders of Istanbul against music and dancing, it was a Bayrami sheikh, Hüseyin Lamekânî, who rebutted his charges.[98]

A further cautionary remark concerns the relations of the Kadızadelis with the state apparatus. I have tried to show that Melek Ahmed Paşa, as a Grand Vizier, was on the opposite side from the Kadızadelis, being a supporter of the janissary aghas against the 'people of the market'; the disdainful attitude of his protégé Evliya Çelebi against the Kadızadelis is telling. However, his grand vizierate (1650-1651) has been described by Zilfi as a period of Kadızadeli success, as the Halveti lodge at Demirkapı was destroyed in 1651 under pressure from Üstüvanî. Nonetheless, one should note that, as in the case of *şeyhülislam* Bahaî Efendi, Kadızadeli activism was intimidating enough to extort measures that they wanted even from officials who were not sympathetic to the movement. After all, right after the destruction of the *tekke* at Demirkapı, the Kadızadelis attacked another Halveti lodge, only to be faced down by the Sufis' own protectors, including armed janissaries under the *samsuncubaşı* Ömer Ağa, himself a disciple of the sheikh of the lodge. In the end, the order granted by Melek Ahmed Paşa was annulled under pressure from a prominent member of the janissary 'junta', as seen above.[99] On the other hand, such measures could be interpreted as concessions in the ideological field, in order to keep intact the balance of power in the socio-economic one. Zilfi observes that the Kadızadelis "were at least temporarily useful in creating the proper climate for rooting out religious fraud … As the Şeyhülislam Minkarizade Yahya (d. 1678) responded to those who questioned his appointing known Kadizadelis to office, one did not have to agree with the Kadizadelis in order to make use of their fear-inspiring presence".[100]

One cannot be sure to what degree the Kadızadeli movement of 1650-1656 constituted a 'bottom-up' initiative. For all we know, the market revolt of 1651 certainly did; insofar we can establish the connection with the 'fundamentalists', it was an allegiance parallel to an ideological current. The attacks on dervish lodges in that and the following years were of course a popular action, carried out by the Istanbul 'rabble'. However, it is clear

97 A. Fotić, 'Belgrade: A Muslim and Non-Muslim Cultural Centre (Sixteenth-Seventeenth Centuries)', in Anastasopoulos (ed.), *Provincial Elites*, 59-60; N. Clayer, 'Münîrî Belgrâdî. Un représentant de la *'ilmiyye* dans la région de Belgrade, fin XVI^{e}-début XVII^{e} siècle', in S. Praetor and C. K. Neumann (eds), *Frauen, Bilder und Gelehrte. Studien zu Gesellschaft und Künsten im osmanischen Reich = Arts, Women and Scholars: Studies in Ottoman Society and Culture. Festschrift Hans Georg Majer* (Istanbul 2002), 549-568. However, according to Ocak, *Zındıklar ve Mülhidler*, 295, Münirî Belgradî was a Melami dervish.

98 Le Gall, 'Kadızadelis, Nakşbendis and Intra-Sufi Diatribe', 18; Clayer, 'Münîrî Belgrâdî', 559-562.

99 Naima, *Tarih*, 5:56-57; Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, 3/1:368-369; Zilfi, 'Kadizadelis', 259; Eadem, *The Politics of Piety*, 142.

100 Ibid., 189-190.

that all the major leaders of the movement were popular in the palace as well and belonged to high-class political factions. Üstüvanî Efendi, as we have seen above, was very influential in harem circles, especially after Kösem's fall. Do we have then to do with a 'top-down' movement, which used a certain popular support in order to promote the interests of individual preachers and *ulema*? And, in this case, was the janissary-Halveti side the real 'bottom-up' action, occasionally gaining the upper hand and anticipating the broader janissary-guilds alliance of the years to come? For one thing, 'profiteers and usurers', the motive force behind Kadızadeli activism, cannot easily be described as a 'bottom' stratum. It is sure, on the other hand, that the Kadızadelis exerted considerable pressure against the government, especially during the two or three years of the janissary aghas' power and the grand vizierate of Melek Ahmed Paşa.

At any rate, 'bottom-up' reactions constitute another 'bilateral' notion of history; class conflicts are often more complicated and subtle than this term would imply. We cannot decide whether 'the people' of Istanbul were more inclined towards the Kadızadelis or the Halvetis; both sides had considerable popular support. We should examine both intellectual currents and socio-economic conflicts in the *longue durée*, if we are to arrive at such a decision. Unfortunately, the structure of the Istanbul population still remains far from being analysed exhaustively: who exactly constituted the often-mentioned 'rabble'? What was the role of the guilds in popular movements throughout the seventeenth century? Moreover, how was class differentiation inside the guilds themselves expressed politically? To what degree did dervish fraternities, such as the Halvetis or the Bayramis/Hamzevis, transcend social classes? What was the role of the non-Muslim population in Istanbul politics?[101] Such questions require a much more detailed and painstaking study. Indeed, a distinction between 'merchants' and 'artisans' must be kept in mind; 'merchants' seem to constitute the motive power behind the Kadızadeli mob, while 'artisans' were the bulk of the crowd revolting in 1651.[102] It is not easy to discern whether and when these two different strata were acting in common or clashed.

The Mercantile Classes and Fundamentalist Ideas: Some Considerations

It is hard to arrive at a conclusion on the basis of these poor and sometimes contradictory data. However, some questions do arise and may lead to interesting, albeit tentative, hypotheses. The pattern described above connects the Kadızadeli movement to the merchants' and artisans' reaction against the janissary aghas' interference in Istanbul eco-

101 I have touched upon the issue of the participation of 'infidels' in seventeenth-century revolts elsewhere; see Sariyannis, '"Mob", "Scamps" and Rebels', 14; cf. Idem, '"Neglected Trades": Glimpses into the 17th Century Istanbul Underworld', *Turcica*, 38 (2006), 162. On all those questions, see also the pioneering work by Yi, *Guild Dynamics*, *passim*; cf. also Eadem, 'Artisans' Networks and Revolt in Late Seventeenth-Century Istanbul: An Examination of the Istanbul Artisans' Rebellion of 1688', in E. Gara, M. E. Kabadayı, and C. K. Neumann (eds), *Popular Protest and Political Participation in the Ottoman Empire: Studies in Honor of Suraiya Faroqhi* (Istanbul 2011), 105-126.

102 I owe this observation to a hint by Suraiya Faroqhi.

nomic life in the early 1650s. The Kadızadelis may have thus provided an ideological platform for the Istanbul merchants in their struggle for a more active role in politics. The merchants seem to have chosen the Kadızadeli ideas in order to promote their interests politically, as the fundamentalists were the chief ideological enemy of their opponents' mentors and spiritual guides. Now, the question is whether they did so just because their opponents, Kösem's janissary aghas, had already chosen the Sufi side. An alternative option for the historian is the tempting hypothesis that there was a more permanent connection of the merchants with 'fundamentalist' ideas.

The question could be posed in more general terms as follows: did fundamentalist ideas play the role of 'mercantile ethics' in the way the 'Protestant ethic' did in contemporaneous Europe? This would bring Ottoman ideological currents very close to European ones, namely, the Calvinist and Puritan movement in seventeenth-century England. Various scholars have suggested a similarity between socio-economic developments in Western Europe and the Ottoman Empire during the seventeenth century, focusing, *inter alia*, on the emergence of urban commercial classes who find themselves in an increased position of strength.[103] The evolution of Protestant ideas in the late sixteenth and throughout the seventeenth century has been interpreted in the context of these emerging mercantile strata, who found in Max Weber's famous 'Protestant ethic' a suitable legitimisation of their aims and interests.

I am not the first to propose a similarity between the Kadızadelis and their European contemporaries. In a book review published electronically in 2006, Gottfried Hagen suggested that the Kadızadeli movement could be fruitfully compared to the English Puritans, in order to enhance the interesting symmetries observed in seventeenth-century England, China, and the Ottoman Empire.[104] As Kafadar notes,[105]

---

103 See, for instance, J. Fletcher, 'Integrative History: Parallels and Interconnections in the Early Modern Period, 1500-1800', *JTS*, 9 (1985), 37-57, esp. 50 (cf. also 52); H. Berktay and S. Faroqhi (eds), *New Approaches to State and Peasant in Ottoman History* (London 1992); R. A. Abou-El-Haj, *Formation of the Modern State: The Ottoman Empire, Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries* (Albany 1991). Wholesalers who supplied meat to the capital seem to have particularly prospered in this period; Faroqhi, 'Crisis and Change', 496-499. The same applies to usurers and moneylenders financing the tax-farming system (with their importance growing towards the eighteenth century); McGowan, 'The Age of the *Ayan*s', 705. On the growth of commercial life in Istanbul from the mid seventeenth century onwards, cf. R. Murphey, 'The Growth in Istanbul's Commercial Capacity, 1700-1765: The Role of New Commercial Construction and Renovation in Urban Renewal', *ActOrHung*, 61/1-2 (2008), 147-155.

104 G. Hagen, 'Osman II and the Cultural History of Ottoman Historiography', H-Net book review of G. Piterberg, *An Ottoman Tragedy: History and Historiography at Play* (http://www.h-net.msu.edu/reviews/showrev.cgi?path=8331153159749). Hagen states that the Kadızadelis have "already been compared to the Puritans", citing Ocak's article (Ocak, 'Kadızâdeliler Hareketi'). However, Ocak uses the term 'Puritanism' only as a translation of *dinde tasfiye*, i.e., religious purism. On Max Weber's thesis and Islam, cf. the interesting but inadequate observations of B. S. Turner, 'Islam, Capitalism and Weber's Theses', *The British Journal of Sociology*, 25/2 (1974), 230-243.

105 Kafadar, 'Janissaries and Other Riffraff', 121. However, I think that on p. 122 Kafadar mis-

> … one should beware the … tendency to dump the Kadizadeli movement into the dustbin of "reaction" or to attribute to it an unreasoned, innate conservatism. In its puritanical sensibility and opposition to the reading of the Kur'an in return for monetary rewards endowed for the expiation of one's sins there are parallels to the Reformation. Its less-than-warm attitude to price controls and to the unproductive vakıf-related jobs (of the readers of Kur'anic verses) could be interpreted as "economic rationalism", while its rigorously literal legalism could be seen to embody some "legal rationalism" that questioned the preponderant use of vague and subjective criteria such as *istihsan* and *örf*.

Of course, the comparison is not as simple as it sounds; for one thing, a cardinal point in the Protestant ethic was the high evaluation of profit, as a fair reward for man's godly labour. In the Muslim case, on the contrary, the Kadızadelis' mentor, Birgivî Mehmed, had written about "the corruptness of human transactions that are undertaken for the sake of the vicious thing, coined money" (*derahim-i mazrubenin ihtilâli ecliyçün muamelat-ı nâs fesadında*) and taken sides in the debate on cash waqfs (*vakf al-nukud*) against Ebussuud.[106] Nonetheless, we can find here an *argumentum ex silentio* for our case, since neither the attack upon "coined money" (*derahim-i mazrube*) nor the cash-waqf controversy, directly touching upon the legitimacy of usury and interest-taking, ever appeared among the issues that the Kadızadelis put forward.[107] Nor did the fundamentalist leaders ever speak against usury (*riba*), although it was prohibited in the Qur'an.[108] In his-

interprets Naima's text, when he regards the Kadızadeli Ebu Ahmedoğlu as an exponent of "a quasi-mercantilistic turn of mind among the Ottomans". In the text, Ebu Ahmedoğlu scorns Zülfikar Ağa, who defends the virtues of cabbage before the Indian ambassador; see the text translated by B. Lewis, *Istanbul and the Civilization of the Ottoman Empire* (Norman 1963), 170-172, and cf. Zilfi, *The Politics of Piety*, 118-119. Kafadar had pointed to the market's support to the Kadızadelis already in his 'The New Visibility of Sufism in Turkish Studies and Cultural Life', in R. Lifchez (ed.), *The Dervish Lodge: Architecture, Art, and Sufism in Ottoman Turkey* (Berkeley and Oxford 1992), 308.

106 Kâtib Çelebi, *Mizanü'l-Hak*, 122, 124; Zilfi, *The Politics of Piety*, 145; Çavuşoğlu, 'The Kadizâdeli Movement', 55-59 (who also notes that, according to Birgivî, "commercial transactions such as *mudârebe* and *mu'âmele*" were also unfit for a pious act). On the 'cash-waqf controversy', see Mandaville, 'Usurious Piety' (esp. 304-306 for Birgivî's attitude); C. Imber, *Ebu's-su'ud: The Islamic Legal Tradition* (Edinburgh 1997), 144ff. Even in the mid sixteenth century, when this controversy arose, the Halveti Şeyh Bali Efendi took sides with Ebussuud, anticipating thus the Halveti opposition to the Kadızadelis during the next century (Mandaville, 'Usurious Piety', 301-304).

107 On these issues, see Kâtib Çelebi, *Mizanü'l-Hak*; Naima, *Tarih*, 6:229-230; Öztürk, 'Islamic Orthodoxy', 306ff.; Çavuşoğlu, 'The Kadizâdeli Movement', 183ff.; Zilfi, *The Politics of Piety*, 136. Çavuşoğlu, 'The Kadizâdeli Movement', 57, notices the absence of any such mention in the sources, but does not comment on it.

108 Birgivî had also spoken vehemently against usury: "Most of the waqf administrators are ignorant and don't recognize the pictures of usury in the Book; they make profit with loans and sale. Any loan from which profit is made is usurious. Some of them lead a dissolute life, taking interest without even going through the motions of using legally permissible devices to do so.

tory sometimes 'the sound of silence' is as loud as explicit references, and those problems that the Kadızadelis never referred to may matter as much as those that they did refer to. It seems as though the Kadızadeli theorists picked out very carefully from Birgivî's work whatever issue did not conflict with big merchants, profiteers and usurers, who, as we have seen, constituted the backbone of the movement. It is to be noted that the *şeyhülislam* Çatalcalı Ali Efendi (1674-1686), a follower, as it seems, of Vanî Efendi and a supporter of the 'fundamentalist' interpretations of the law, not only defended in his *fetva*s cash waqfs using money interest, but also condemned whoever spoke against this practice. This particular *fetva* goes as follows:[109]

> If a self-styled wisecrack in a community claims that the foundations money is *haram*; those contributing to it in the form of donations are worthy of hell; the *ribh* thus obtained is also *haram* and forbids the faithful to stand behind the imam in the mosque, thus causing desertion in all mosques in that city as well as rift and commotion amongst that city's population, what is to be done to such a man within the bounds of the *shari'a*? Answer: He is reprimanded, severely chided and pressure is brought to bear upon him. In case he is not redeemed then he is goaled (*sic*) until he dissociates himself from such ideas and statements.

Even if Ali Efendi was not a Kadızadeli *stricto sensu*,[110] the *fetva* shows that there were indeed people in the late seventeenth century who followed Birgivî's ideas strictly, which renders all the more striking the fact that *riba* was never touched upon by the Kadızadeli preachers.

A very interesting text, studied recently by Jan Schmidt, may show the complexity of the issue.[111] Written by the mufti of Larende, Hamza Efendi, in 1678, i.e., just at the beginning of the 'third wave' of the Kadızadelis, it concerns rules for commercial transactions laid out for pious merchants who wished to avoid usury and other sins. Hamza

---

They make waqf of usury and the forbidden, pure and simple, giving it to the administrators who consume the usury. They are in the same position as someone struck mad and frenzied by the devil…" (quoted in Mandaville, 'Usurious Piety', 306). Vanî Efendi had been charged with taking interest or encouraging it; see Terzioğlu, 'Sufi and Dissident', 343. A description of an individual Kadızadeli as a "usurer" (*ribâ-hor*) by Evliya Çelebi fits well in this context, although it might also be some formulaic convention; R. Dankoff (ed.), *Evliya Çelebi in Bitlis: The Relevant Section of the* Seyahatname (Leiden 1990), 294.

109 Quoted in N. Çağatay, '*Ribâ* and Interest Concept and Banking in the Ottoman Empire', *SI*, 32 (1970), 64.

110 On his 'fundamentalist' influences, cf. G. Art, *Şeyhülislâm Fetvalarında Kadın ve Cinsellik* (Istanbul 1996). According to Terzioğlu, 'Sufi and Dissident', 231, Ali Efendi "acted in consort with, rather than under the pressure of, Vani", although "not necessarily because [he himself] shared Vani's convictions"; moreover, we do not know whether this particular *fetva* was issued before or after the latter's removal and end of direct influence.

111 J. Schmidt, 'Hamza Efendi's Treatise on Buying and Selling of 1678', *Oriente Moderno*, XXV (LXXXVI) n.s. (2006) [special issue: *The Ottomans and Trade*, eds E. Boyar and K. Fleet], 181-186.

Efendi quotes explicitly Birgivî Efendi, but none of the prominent authors of the movement, such as Kadızade or Üstüvanî. Hamza Efendi gives a detailed account of transactions which are considered legal, with several sub-cases or conditions. His account of usury, to which he devotes an entire chapter, is quite enlightening. After depicting the eternal punishment of whoever commits usury, Hamza Efendi proceeds thus, in the words of Jan Schmidt (underlining is mine):

> Usury is defined here as the dishonest use of added or detracted value in a transaction, for instance in using adulterated coins or bartering goods of uneven quality or repaying a loan with an added sum (unless that sum be declared to be a gift by the debtor) or giving a loan for an indefinite period of time. Tricks to obtain interest (*hile-i şeriye*), for instance through a double contract of sale, should be avoided.

Not having seen the original nor a transcription, I cannot be sure whether the wording renders exactly what seems to me to be a subtle opening of legal 'windows' for dealing in loans with interest. At any rate, Hamza Efendi's treatise does not seem to have been popular, and was forgotten together with its provincial author. Until we run into other similar texts, if any, we may not reach any safe conclusions. But, in any case, another interesting point in the treatise is the distinction between merchant and tradesman: "merchants should always keep in mind that the bazaar is essentially a place of evil, as are the tradesmen there".

However, this is not only a matter of explicitly stated values and attitudes; Paul Rycaut had attributed, as seen above, the merchants' support to the Kadızadelis to the "sedentary life" of tradesmen, which "affords opportunity and nutriment to a melancholy, and distempered fancy".[112] A rigid and austere way of life, as that proposed by the Kadızadelis, fits well into the ideals of a merchant class, thirsty for profit and ready to renounce pleasures, such as the coffee-house or public entertainment, in order to pursuit financial gain. On the other hand, Sufi ideas often promote poverty and total trust to God, based on the conception that everyone's daily sustenance (*rızk*) is ordained by God. The great al-Ghazali (d. 1111), respected by the orthodox and mystics alike, had declared that economic activity as a merchant or official was incompatible with being a true Sufi.[113] The Halveti Seyyid Hasan's way of life, for instance, as described in his diary, full of friendly gatherings and visits, certainly does not favour such a quest for gain and profit. The social base of the Halvetis seems to cover the lower strata of the artisans and petty tradesmen, organised in their traditional guilds (another part of the followers would consist also of members of the administrative and military elite, just as the Kadızadelis also had influence on the palace guards). If the guilds, with their conservative and traditionalist concept of time and their narrow gain perspective, were always welcoming hedonistic and 'idle' ways of life,[114] the aspiring merchants, struggling to shake off the control of the guilds,

112 Ricaut, *Present State*, 247.

113 Quoted in K. Kreiser, 'The Dervish Living', in Lifchez (ed.), *The Dervish Lodge*, 53.

114 In this context, the argument that coffee-houses kept people away from work is telling; see, for instance, Kâtib Çelebi, *Mizanü'l-Hak*, 54; İbrahim Peçevi, *Tarih-i Peçevi*, Vol. 1 (Istan-

would probably choose what seems to us today a 'fundamentalist' attitude of strict morals and rigid organisation of time (although these two sides seem to have co-operated in the 1651 revolt, perhaps in an early phase of their relationship).[115] A cautionary remark here is that merchants ought also to favour a spirit of luxury, which would promote consumption; however, one could observe that the same happened with the ascetic Protestant ethic, which did not prevent trade flourishing in contemporaneous Western Europe. Moreover, by adopting such an austere ethic, the merchant strata could be targeting not only the 'idle' life of the traditional guilds, but also the exhibition of wealth by the members of the administrative elite, who were in this period intensely antagonising them.[116] As far as this last argument is concerned, we should not overlook the fact that non-elite newcomers to 'big profit' were also accused of exhibition of wealth beyond their rank and status.[117] Ottoman sources also accused the Kadızadelis of hypocrisy, citing various examples of individual followers of the movement who were in fact anything but ascetics.[118]

---

bul 1283/1866-1867), 363-365. Cf. also Saraçgil, 'Generi voluttuari'; R. S. Hattox, *Coffee and Coffeehouses: The Origins of a Social Beverage in the Medieval Near East* (Washington 1988).

115 On the struggle of the guilds to keep the merchants under control, cf. İnalcık, 'Capital Formation', 104-106; Faroqhi, 'Crisis and Change', 587; Yi, *Guild Dynamics*, 57ff. Kâtib Çelebi, *Mizanü'l-Hak*, 32-33, seems to reflect Kadızadeli criticisms of the degeneration of Sufism into a way of making one's living. For a similar criticism cf. Sâfî, *Hasbıhâl-i Sâfî*, ed. H. D. Batislam (Istanbul 2003), 144-146, 165-166; E. J. W. Gibb, *A History of Ottoman Poetry*, Vol. 3 (London 1904), 214-218 (and cf. F. İz, *Eski Türk Edebiyatında Nazım. XIII. Yüzyıldan XIX. Yüzyıl Ortasına Kadar Yazmalardan Seçilmiş Metinler*, Vol. I, Part I [Istanbul 1966], 117-119); Nâbî, *Hayriyye*, ed. İ. Pala (Istanbul 1989), 134ff.

116 On the involvement of the elite in commercial activities and the controversies that arose, see İ. M. Kunt, 'Derviş Mehmed Paşa, Vezir and Entrepreneur: A Study in Ottoman Political-Economic Theory and Practice', *Turcica*, 9 (1977), 197-214; Idem, *The Sultan's Servants: The Transformation of Ottoman Provincial Government, 1550-1650* (New York 1983), 92; Faroqhi, 'Crisis and Change', 547ff.; I. Togan, 'Ottoman History by Inner Asian Norms', in Berktay and Faroqhi (eds), *New Approaches to State and Peasant*, 201. 'Consumption studies' may contribute a lot to this *problématique*; see D. Quataert (ed.), *Consumption Studies and the History of the Ottoman Empire, 1550-1922: An Introduction* (New York 2000), and esp. (in this context) Chapter 4: A. Salzmann, 'The Age of Tulips: Confluence and Conflict in Early Modern Consumer Culture (1550-1730)', 83-106.

117 See, for instance, Naima, *Tarih*, 5:185, who states that after Murad IV's reign many commoners ("avam tarikinde ekseriyâ") became rich and imitated officials and viziers. See also ibid., 1:32; Hezarfen Hüseyin Efendi, *Telhîsü'l-Beyân fî Kavânîn-i Âl-i Osmân*, ed. S. İlgürel (Ankara 1998), 105; R. Murphey, 'The Veliyyuddin Telhis: Notes on the Sources and Interrelations between Koçi Bey and Contemporary Writers of Advice to Kings', *Belleten*, 43/171 (1979), 547-571, particularly 560 and n. 15.

118 See, for instance, Naima, *Tarih*, 6:238-240 (summarised in Thomas, *A Study of Naima*, 109). On the other hand, the 'dual ethics', allegedly expounded by some Kadızadelis, seem to have been a standard feature of Ottoman morality, based on the dichotomy between private and public life. See W. Andrews, *Poetry's Voice, Society's Song: Ottoman Lyric Poetry* (Seattle and London 1985), 109ff.; Sariyannis, '"Mob", "Scamps" and Rebels', 9; Idem, 'Law and Morality in Ottoman Society: The Case of Narcotic Substances', in E. Kolovos, P. Kotzageorgis, S. Laiou, and M. Sariyannis (eds), *The Ottoman Empire, the Balkans, the Greek Lands:*

Further analysis of this hypothesis would require a close examination of not only seventeenth and eighteenth-century political treatises, but also moralist texts. Unfortunately, so far only elite-orientated moral treatises are easily available for study, and I am not aware of 'mercantile-minded' texts of this kind, apart from Hamza Efendi's work mentioned above.[119] However, a brief comparison between two didactic poems might suggest that during the next one and a half centuries a 'mercantile' ethic had infiltrated traditional Muslim morality. In his famous *Hayriyye*, written in 1701/1702, the poet Nabi (c.1642-1712) expresses in general the traditional values of the Ottoman elite. He mentions trade and usury scornfully (*taşrada eylemege kesb-i ğınâ / ya ticâret ya zirâat ya ribâ*), while praising the Sufi notion of man's allocated sustenance (*rızk*). As far as the proper use of time is concerned, he cites the well-known motto "time is to be captured" (*dem ğanîmet*), and more generally reproduces the view that time is a good that must not be spent in vain. However, he does not speak of work but of study and charity, exactly the way we would expect of an elite author writing for an elite audience. In this context, Nabi is rather favourable towards backgammon and chess-playing, as he cites symbolic interpretations of these games.[120] About a century later, the eighteenth-century moralist Sünbülzade Vehbi (c.1719-1809) wrote an imitation of Nabi's work, the *Lutfiyye*. There he appears much more adamant than his predecessor against chess and other 'idle occupations', to which he adds fashions such as gardening or keeping birds; moreover, he proceeds as to give advice on regulating one's expenses according to one's resources. Besides, Vehbi writes against coffee and tobacco (while Nabi refers only to intoxicants), thus reflecting a 'fundamentalist' ascetic morality that brings to mind our Kadızadelis.[121] Such changes may

---

Toward a Social and Economic History. Studies in Honor of John C. Alexander (Istanbul 2007), 307-321, esp. 320-321. Strangely enough, the rationale that these Kadızadelis are said to use (some people are better fitted to use hedonistic models of leisure than others) is also used by Kâtib Çelebi, *Mizanü'l-Hak*, 26ff. (and cf. ibid., 115). It can be found even in prominent Sufi works: Mevlâna Celaleddin Rumî wrote that "whatever is pleasant is prohibited, in order not to be widespread among the common people; wine, harp, love of beauty or dance, all are permitted for the elect and prohibited for the common" ("her çiz ki on hoşest nehyest mudâm / tâ mîneşeved delîl-i in merdum-i âm / verne mey u çeng u sûret-i hûb u semâ' / ber hâs helâllest u ber âm harâm"; quoted in Gölpınarlı, *Mevlevîlik*, 78).

119 Elite political texts clearly disapprove of the emerging mercantile strata; see R. Abou Hadj, 'The Ottoman Nasihatname as a Discourse over "Morality"', in A. Temimi (ed.), *Mélanges Professeur Robert Mantran* (Zaghouan 1988), 17-30.

120 Nâbî, *Hayriyye*, 73, 85, 190ff. Kâtib Çelebi contrasts also knowledge, not working, with idleness: O. Ş. Gökyay, *Kâtib Çelebi'den Seçmeler* (Istanbul 1997 [2nd ed.]), 393, 403. On Nabi, cf. *EI*², s.v. 'Nâbî, Yûsuf' (E. G. Ambros); see also M. Sariyannis, 'Ottoman Critics of Society and State, Fifteenth to Early Eighteenth Centuries: Toward a Corpus for the Study of Ottoman Political Thought', *ArchOtt*, 25 (2008), 127-150, esp. 145-147.

121 Vehbî, *Lutfiyye*, ed. S. A. Beyzadeoğlu (Istanbul 1994), 64-65, 160, 162, and *passim*; Gibb, *A History of Ottoman Poetry*, 4:254-255. An interesting similarity: just as the Kadızadelis were considered famous hypocrites, Vehbi was a formidable debauchee and wrote an interesting pornographic poem, the *Şevk-engîz*. See ibid., 4:247-248, 252-253; J. Schmidt, 'Sünbülzâde Vehbî's *Şevk-Engîz*: An Ottoman Pornographic Poem', *Turcica*, 25 (1993), 9-37.

be traced in other kinds of writings as well. In the mid eighteenth century, for instance, the Ottoman diplomat Ahmed Resmî Efendi observed that the hedonistic and lazy life of the Viennese nobility prevented Austria from organising its defence against enemies.[122]

The hypothesis that I suggest could also shed a new light on the debate about the changes in landholding regulations during the 1670s. It will be recalled that Gilles Veinstein has suggested 'intellectual' motivations, attributing the changes to Vanî Efendi's influence on Fazıl Ahmed Paşa's milieu, while Molly Greene and others discern more 'pragmatic' thoughts behind the new system.[123] If, however, we established a connection between the new, 'early capitalist', mentality emerging in Ottoman trade and statesmanship, on the one hand, and the rigid demand for a return to early Islamic values, on the other, both interpretations would apply to different sides of the same change. One of Greene's main objections to Veinstein's view is that there is no evidence that the Kadızadeli theorists ever took up the issue of landownership.[124] However, Kadızadeli-minded statesmen could use the 'fundamentalist' ethics in promoting 'free-trade' measures no matter whether these ethics really applied to the point, just like their Puritan counterparts' commercial behaviour was judged Christian-like, no matter whether Protestant ethics proposed specific ways of economic practice. In a similar way, in 1691, the Grand Vizier Fazıl Mustafa Paşa (among other measures inspired by Islamic Law, but also fitted to the Empire's needs, such as the tripartite *cizye* system) abolished the system of officially fixed prices (*narh*), under the pretext that they were not prescribed in the Sharia (*ahvâl-i narh kitâblarda musarrah değildir. Herkese lâzım olan me'kûlât ü meşrûbât ve melbûsât her ne ise bâyi'den rızâlariyle iştirâ eylesünler*). The indignation shown in Defterdar Mehmed Paşa's (d. 1717) account of this event barely conceals the fact that those who profited from this measure, which did not last for long under the pressure of the guilds (*şehirli ta'ifesi*) and the *ulema*, were profiteering merchants, newcomers to the traditional guild system (*manav muhtekiri ve bakkâl kefereleri*), that is, roughly the same strata described above as the main expounders of fundamentalist ideas.[125] It seems, then, that changes and reforms promoting the interests of such strata kept having ideological recourse to the Kadızadeli programme.

---

122 V. H. Aksan, *An Ottoman Statesman in War and Peace: Ahmed Resmi Efendi, 1700-1783* (Leiden, New York, and Cologne 1995), 61.

123 For Veinstein's view see above, n. 14; for its critique see M. Greene, 'An Islamic Experiment? Ottoman Land Policy on Crete', *Mediterranean Historical Review*, 11 (1996), 60-78. Cf. also E. Kolovos, 'Beyond "Classical" Ottoman *Defter*ology: A Preliminary Assessment of the *Tahrir* Registers of 1670/71 Concerning Crete and the Aegean Islands', in Kolovos *et alii* (eds), *The Ottoman Empire, the Balkans, the Greek Lands*, 201-235; E. Kermeli, 'Caught In Between Faith and Cash: The Ottoman Land System of Crete, 1645-1670', in Anastasopoulos (ed.), *The Eastern Mediterranean under Ottoman Rule*, 17-48.

124 Cf. Sariyannis, 'Ottoman Critics', 148 and n. 88.

125 Defterdar, *Zübde-i Vekayiât*, 387-389; Silâhdar, *Tarih*, 2:566; Raşid, *Tarih*, 2:148-149; cf. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, I:221-222; Faroqhi, 'Crisis and Change', 546. Such descriptions of *nouveaux riches* as ignorant peasants or immigrants were common as early as the end of the sixteenth century; see, for instance, A. Tietze (ed.), *Mustafā 'Ālī's Counsel for Sultans of 1581*, Vol. 1 (Vienna 1979), 58 ("her manav hîle vü fırîb iderek / gendüyi ehl-i mâl u milket ide").